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When one browses the shelves of a bookshop, 
it becomes evident that military history enjoys 
wide and sustainable popularity among the 
reading public. There might be regional, 
national, cultural and temporal variation in 
the areas of interest but one thing seems clear 
from a European or Western perspective : 
the two world wars of the twentieth century 
dominate popular history narratives and 
public memory – as well as much academic 
research.
The role of past wars and battles, glorious 
victories and bitter(sweet) defeats in histories 
of nations and their identities has been a 
staple of nationalism studies and memory 
studies for decades. The commemoration 
of wars and war-related politics of history 
are transnational phenomena. There are 
few nations or groups that have claimed 
sovereignty whose hegemonic narratives have 
not been grounded in violent struggle for 
freedom and the defence of national borders. 
In the politics of nationalistic identity, the 
victorious heroes and the defeated seem to be 
equal. Both sides possess valuable building 
blocks for collective identities. 
Yet, as noted, warfare is essentially a trans-
national activity and the possibilities for 
the study and teaching of military history 
transcend national boundaries. In addition, 
the cultures of war, various experiences, 
emotional histories, trauma studies and stu-
dies on gender and warfare, just to name a 
few, have enriched our understanding about 
wartime histories and have been included in 
academic curricula.
What about popular histories ? How can 
academic advances be communicated to a 
wider audience ? How have the histories of 
traumatic war experiences, for instance, been 
received by the general public ? My case 
study is Finland, where the shift from rather 
old-fashioned military and political history 
to a broader set of approaches, took place 
relatively late, in the mid-2000s, and is still 
making its impact among the public at large.
Old versus new
First, a short introduction into the differences 
between the “old” and “new” approaches 
to military history (in fact the “new” cultural 
and social approaches are hardly new but are 
products of the social constructivist advances 
in the humanities in the 1960s and 70s.)
One thing in common with these approaches 
to military history, is that, whereas traditio-
nal combat and strategy-oriented military 
history is first and foremost concerned with 
combat and strategy, the cultural, social and 
emotional histories of war have often come 
struck by the insight that the two world wars 
have greatly influenced the emotional styles 
in a given society or, indeed, some previous 
cultural mores regarding emotional expression 
have contributed to wartime experience. For 
instance, the British notion of ‘stiff upper lip’ 
was a late-nineteenth-century construct of the 
era of the Empire that reached its peak in the 
world wars and saw a gradual decline in the 
post-war period. The myth of the Blitz may 
seem to reflect nostalgically the pinnacle of 
the stiff upper lip, but in reality the Second 
World War marked the swansong of this idea 
The front cover of Sodan henki, designed by Pekka Loiri. Sodan 
henki (2015), The Spirit of War, is the first portrayal of the history of 
emotions of the Winter War. The book traces the origins and various 
legacies of one of the most revered national myths.
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before it gave in to the new-found liberation of 
emotional expression32.
Old-fashioned military history has, sometimes 
explicitly, at other times implicitly or even 
unwillingly, contributed to hegemonic national 
narratives. Military historians, the state and 
the armed forces have a long history of co-
operation. A major share of military history 
has been researched and taught in military 
colleges. Some academics have scorned the 
perceived “unacademic” qualities of military 
history and the problems that arise when the 
state institution of the army conducts its own 
research into itself. Historians who adhere to 
the cultural and social history of warfare do 
not generally want to see themselves as the 
political tools of the state. 
In addition, and in spite of an intensifying 
dialogue between the disciplines33, it may 
be true that one rarely meets a military 
historian who is fluent in recent advances in 
gender studies or the history of emotions or 
some other trendy area of Academia. This is 
one reason why interdisciplinary war studies 
are welcomed by many academics who are 
interested in the short- and long-term impact 
that crises cause in culture and society. The 
effects of war do not begin when the fighting 
erupts, nor do they end when arms are laid 
down.
In a nutshell, “traditional” military history 
has concentrated on military and political 
leaders, geopolitics, strategy, combat and 
rearmament. The “new military history” has 
been composed of various cultural and social 
aspects of war that can often be labelled as 
interdisciplinary, including for instance the 
literary, anthropological, commemorative, ar-
tistic history of warfare, as well as the history 
of emotions in warfare34.
By the end of the twentieth century, the cul-
tural history of war34had established itself 
as a field of history in many of the Western 
societies. The shift did not happen in a va-
cuum, however. It became possible during the 
“Cold Peace” of the post-Second World War 
era that saw major social innovations. These 
changes encouraged fresh and critical insights 
into the world wars and war in general. The 
“old” military history became one of the 
scapegoats of the conservative social system. 
Not everywhere, though.
Traditional military history as a reservoir of 
national sentiment : the Finnish case
As a case study, in my native Finland popu-
lar military history, especially war-related 
conser vative political history, enjoys a wide 
popu larity that is rooted in the rather short 
history of Finland as a sovereign nation35. 
Predominant collective identities and politics 
of history are based on a Second World 
War narrative that emphasises small-nation 
struggle against totalitarian superpower, 
the Soviet Union. The importance of this 
narrative is magnified because it masked the 
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bloody beginnings of the nation almost 100 
years ago. The Civil War of 1918, a class 
conflict that divided Finland’s society sharply 
in two, caused the death of more than one 
per cent of the population in just six months. 
Such divisive violence could not form a 
viable founda tional myth for the nation. 
Although a gradual harmonisation had begun 
in the interwar period in the society that had 
retained its parliamentary system, it was the 
perceived and experienced unifica tion during 
the Winter War (1939-40) that was adopted 
as a new and viable foundational myth al-
ready during the Russo-Finnish conflict in 
question. 
Subsequent popular narratives, especially 
those constructed since the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, have 
fitted the later, politically controversial 
pha ses of the Second World War into the 
Winter War theme. This story emphasises a 
victimhood that was not passive but active 
axnd justifiable as self-defence. Finns as 
perpetrators and Finland as a de facto ally 
of the Third Reich from 1941 until 1944 
do not generally appear in predominant 
popular narratives and collective identity 
politics.
During the Cold War era, military history 
was preserved as a conservative discipline. 
It can be argued that the usual strictly ope-
rative narrative of military history acted 
as a form of nationalistic resistance in a 
country that had been overshadowed by 
the constraints the Soviet Union posed for 
public discourses and where other sectors of 
society and academia had adopted a more 
“progressive” stance. Conservative, strategy-
oriented military histo ry perhaps acted for 
many people as a safe haven, where one 
could maintain pride re garding the successful 
defence of the nation and play down the 
problematic alliance that had existed with 
Germany.
The 1990s, in turn, saw a so-called neopatriotic 
shift regarding the remembrance of the Se-
cond World War. In the late 1990s, when 
secondary-school pupils who had been born 
in 1980 answered a questionnaire about their 
historical consciousness, the only historical 
event in Finnish history that formed a coherent 
picture in their youthful minds was the Second 
World War. What was that picture alike ? The 
educated youth of the 1990s overwhelmingly 
understood the Finnish participation in the 
Second World War as a great success story, 
evincing the resilience and collective pride at 
a kind of David versus Goliath situation. In the 
late-1990s Finnish society was recuperating 
from a massive recession and the economy was 
on the rise. Many of the youth had connected 
the Finnish war effort with expected successes 
in the future. It had become part of their 
identity, a textbook example of how collec-
tive and individual identities feed off each 
other36. Interestingly, during the 1990s, people 
of my generation often identified themselves 
as more conservative than their parents. For 
Finland, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
marked the real end to the War, 50 years 
after its conclusion. Patriotic military history 
was celebrated and heroic popular histories 
abounded.
The front cover of Murtuneet mielet, designed by Mika 
Tuominen. Murtuneet mielet (2013), Broken Minds, became 
a huge success among the reading public. The book’s 
portrayal of psychiatric symptoms of Finnish soldiers of the 
Second World War was an eye-opener for many readers) 
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Thus the cultural and “new military history” 
shift did not properly take place in Finland 
until the early twenty-first century and one 
of its initial impetuses was the critique 
of “nationalistic” historiography and old-
fashion ed military history37. The Finnish 
example reveals the intrinsic relationship that 
military histories and the state have. Whether 
old or new, military history becomes an easily 
politicised discipline.
In a small civil society where even academic 
war-related historiography is consumed by the 
reading public, those with an inclination for 
writing critically for a wider audience have 
to find ways to communicate their thoughts 
through the usual fuss and certain prejudices. 
I have recently published material on the 
history of emotions of the Winter War for the 
general public, with a focus on how unification 
during the Winter War was expressed and 
propagated and how it started to crumble 
after the conflict38. Some of the first public 
reactions to the book often deemed the theme 
conservative and traditional – it is the Winter 
War after all, what is there left to look at ? 
“You must be very patriotic”. When I pointed 
out that I wanted to shake the myth, see how 
the “spirit of the Winter War” came about, 
who controlled it, what sort of cracks were 
there in the feeling and how its legacy became 
politicised, I often received concerned looks. 
“You are not going to debunk the myth, are 
you ?” To be fair, the majority of the reader 
feedback has been positive, sometimes some-
what relieved. For example, a couple of rea-
ders told me face-to-face, that they saw me 
wanting to make cracks in the myth and ex-
pressed relief that I did not succeed. They 
liked the book, however, I suppose. Writing 
about the emotional side the war is a tricky 
business. Both readers and the media often 
interpret one either as a traditionalist or a 
radical.
But where do the prejudices come from ? 
Are the readers of popular military or home-
front histories not ready for novel insights or 
are they predisposed to be given a certain 
interpretation ? Or could it be the case, as 
I suspect is surprisingly common, that the 
critics of popular military histories act as 
conservative gatekeepers between writers and 
readers ? First, I will take a look at the latter 
option; it is easier to decipher.
There are two identifiable strategies used 
to downplay popular histories that employ 
a “new military history” approach. For 
example, a work that addresses rank-and-
file grievances and their other-than-patriotic 
motives might be criticised for lacking, or 
even misunderstanding, the “big picture”, 
that is the survival narrative of Finland. This 
strategy is, however, becoming less prevalent. 
The passage of time and more diverse 
identities have diminished the public need 
for defending clear-cut memory politics of the 
heroic war effort. Much more challenging is 
to overcome the expectations of the critics, 
who are literate in traditional political history. 
Accordingly, many of them expect war-
related historiography to be political history. 
If it is not, it has traditionally been handled 
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as historiography that concerns women and 
children, or aspects that are not important in 
the big picture. Critical insights delivered in 
the form and style of political history might 
be accepted more easily than a newer way of 
research (and there have been major advances 
in the writing of wartime political history 
intended for a general audience during past 
15 years)39. Obviously, this concerns the 
reading public as well.
What is the problem, then? I think the 
problem arises from the fact that the high 
status of political history continues the legacy 
of the Cold War era and thus contributes 
to the ongoing Finnish survival narrative 
that effectively downplays other narratives. 
Political history in the context of Finnish 
wartime concerns itself with difficult choices 
and inescapable geopolitics but usually leaves 
wider social and cultural consequences un-
touched. Even works of arguably lesser quality 
in the field of political history often receive 
more public interest at the expense of cultural 
approaches. This will probably change in 
time but meanwhile, the domination of 
political history limits the public’s access to 
other ways of approaching popular history. 
To avoid scapegoating the critics, or the 
public, it should be added that the “illiteracy” 
of the critics is also due to the relative lack 
of “new military history” intended for a 
wider audience. It is just starting to make its 
breakthrough in Finland.
As it is, readers are interested in both “old” 
and “new” military histories and many of 
them sell well. Indeed, the most visible of 
the new approaches have been studies on 
shellshock and trauma, as well as the histories 
of home-front experiences. The best-selling 
non-fiction book in 2013 in fact dealt with 
war psychiatry and traumatised servicemen. 
The book Broken Minds (Murtuneet mielet) 
also received the most distinguished national 
literary award for non-fiction. Based on a 
PhD dissertation, it was a prime example of 
how academic research was transformed 
into exemplary popular history40. The book 
connected new insights from the history of 
emotions to trauma studies. The author, Ville 
Kivimäki, argued persuasively for culturally 
shaped trauma symptoms and participated 
in transnational discussions about the nature 
of war trauma, but for the reading public the 
catch was not there. For example, the book 
provided many readers with a way to connect 
with their family memories and, essentially, 
silences around war experiences. The book 
was by no means a first attempt to look at 
the Finnish war effort from an angle that 
ren dered the traditional, political “survival 
narrative” irrelevant. Nevertheless, Broken 
Minds became a huge, eye-opening success 
among both readers and critics. Why ?
This example illustrates the apparent 
predisposition of a reading public that has 
become suspicious and tired of armed for-
ces and state-oriented military and political 
history. In addition to the obvious merits 
of the book, the public has interpreted it in 
the context of a Western therapy culture 
that has contributed to the public interest 
An air raid of Mikkeli on 5 January 1940 has hit a local textile shop. 
The headquarters of the Finnish armed forces were based in the 
town during the Second World War. SA-kuva. (Finnish Armed Forces 
photograph Archive)
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in emotional experiences, expression, and 
the idea of transgenerational trauma41. In 
academic circles transgenerational trauma is 
a contentious but very interesting concept; 
difficult experiences are transferred from one 
generation to another culturally, in child-
rearing practices or even epigenetically.
In Finnish public discourse the traumatised 
servicemen, however, became the forebears 
of “our” collective, contemporary, unworked 
trauma. In other words, whereas the con-
servative gaze at the wartime past sees the 
Finnish war effort primarily as a success in 
defence and heralds a collective heroism 
in noble victimhood, the trauma discourse 
has transformed the wartime past into the 
founding trauma and the newly sparked 
discussion as the first attempts at initiating a 
“healing process”. Some popular narratives 
even trace contemporary social problems, such 
as drinking and a slightly higher prevalence of 
violence than in Western Europe, back to war 
experiences without meaningful comparison 
to other European war experiences42. There 
is not necessarily anything untruthful in these 
dominant discussions. However, in both cases 
the focus often turns on “our” suffering.
An introspective therapy culture, coupled with 
the sob stories of the media, has flourished 
in Finland as typified in the West during the 
past decade or two43, and psychologically 
tuned debates on war trauma have been in 
the media since the turn of the millennium, 
but suddenly, as we entered the current 
decade, the media was overwhelmed with 
references to war-related trauma. “Trauma” 
is a politicised concept, obviously, but in 
this decade Finnish debates have become 
something more. On the one hand, old-
fashioned memory politics has continued 
to emphasise the patriotic heritage of the 
Second World War in retaining sovereignty 
and investing Finns with collective pride. 
On the other hand, the public witnesses an 
outcry for an on-going healing and collec-
tive introspection without which the nation 
cannot leave its nerve-shattering experiences 
behind. In the process, the analytic value of 
the concept of “trauma” has evaporated into 
the mediasphere.
I think this bipolar constellation aptly illus-
trates the challenges facing historians 
who are writing for a wide audience. 
The prevalent media discussions steer the 
public interpretation of popular military 
historiography. It is easily labelled as 
“conservative” or “new”, “patriotic” or “in-
tentionally critical”. Polemic headlines sell 
books. Inevitably, writing for a wide au-
dience raises ethical questions. Publishing 
houses and authors alike are tempted to 
170Debat - Débat
44. For an overview, see Jan PlamPer, The History of Emotions : An Introduction (transl. by 
Keith Tribe), Oxford, 2015. 45. For the concept of emotional style, see PeTer n. sTearns, 
American Cool : Constructing a Twentieth-Century Emotional Style, New York, 1994; for 
the concept of emotional regime, see william m. reDDy, The Navigation of Feeling : A Frame-
work for the History of Emotions, Cambridge, 2001, p. 124-129. 46. Literature is abun-
dant, see e.g. ville kivimäki, Battled nerves…; PeTer leese, Shell Shock : Traumatic Neurosis 
and the British Soldiers of the First World War, Rev. ed., London, 2014; eDgar Jones & simon 
wessely, Shell Shock to PTSD : Military Psychiatry from 1900 to the Gulf War, New York, 
2005; Paul wanke, Russian/Soviet Military Psychiatry, 1904-1945, London, 2005; see also 
Joanna Bourke, Dismembering the Male : Men’s Bodies, Britain and the Great War, London, 
1996. 47. Joanna Bourke, An Intimate History of Killing : Face-to-face Killing in Twentieth-
Century Warfare, London, 1999; iD., Fear : A Cultural History, London, 2005; ville kivimäki 
& Tuomas TePora, “War of Hearts: Love and Collective Attachment as Integrating Factors 
in Finland During World War II”, in Journal of Social History 43, 2009) n° 2, p. 285-305; 
iD., Sodan Henki…
make choices that push for politicised and/
or emotional responses from the media 
and the public. However, emotions history 
need not be emotional history. I agree that 
popu lar military historiography can, and 
should, help readers to assess their own 
identities vis-à-vis the past and collective 
memories. Sometimes it feels, however, as 
if popular historiography is expected to 
enable readers to weep the war away from 
their transgenerational memories. Trauma and 
emotional response form a rich field of 
historical research that still spark passions, 
yet emotions history concerns both short- and 
long-term change in emotional norms, styles, 
values and concepts.
Emotions – new turn in the cultural history of war ?
In the light of the emotional responses to 
novel ways of presenting military history, it is 
well worth looking at the latest fashionable 
but promising development in academia, the 
“emotional turn”, which has also established 
the history of emotions as a distinct field 
of history44. So far the possibilities for co-
operation between the cultural history of war 
and the history of emotions have been relatively 
weak, given the rather explicit connections 
they share. The politics of emotions, or the 
construction and maintenance of emotional 
“styles” and “regimes”45, and wartime expe-
riences seem to offer an obvious link, for 
instance.
Obviously, as evidenced above, the histories 
of shellshock and war trauma form the 
backbone of current emotions histories of 
the twentieth-century warfare. This is perhaps 
the most thoroughly researched field in the 
cultural history of war that has enriched 
our understanding about the cultural and 
temporal variation in war-related trauma and 
medical history in general. It has also brought 
the history of the body into military history. 
Lesions of body and mind are inseparable46. 
Other exercises in the history of emotions 
and war have focussed on certain emotions 
such as fear, or the analysis of soldiers’ and 
civilians’ historical motivations for fighting. 
The fear of the anonymity of faceless civilian 
bombings in modern warfare is a distinct 
feeling from the early-modern civilian fear 
of the enemy plunder. Yet, in terms of the 
history of emotions war is not only about dire 
experiences and trauma, it is sometimes as 
much about love, attachment, enthusiasm and 
collective fervour47.
Further possibilities in terms of the history 
of emotions are promising but challenging. 
France donated Finland Morane-Saulnier fighters during the Winter War. 
Later the Finnish Air Force acquired more of them from German spoils of 
war supplies. These Finnish Morane-Saulnier fighters were photographed 
in Latva airstrip during the Continuation War in September 1943. The 
swastika was the symbol of the Finnish Air Force from 1918 until 1945. 
SA-kuva. (Finnish Armed Forces photograph Archive) 
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They also provide historians with tools for 
communicating the challenges to a more ge-
ne ral public without resorting to tauto logical 
trauma rhetoric. Nuancing the insight into 
the long-lasting emotional burden of war, the 
history of emotions may even chal lenge the 
public discourse on the emotional heritage 
of war. I mean, is it not worth while to ask 
whether the ongoing trauma debate is con-
nected with the contemporary emphasis on 
memory politics and values stressing emo-
tional responses, or are we truly experiencing 
a contemporary phase of healing after the 
post-war silences in the process of trans-
generational trauma ?
When charting emotional change, the his-
tory of emotions has concentrated on long-
term changes in emotional vocabulary, con-
cepts and norms of emotional expression 
and behaviour. Wars and crises may at 
first glance strike us as major emotional up-
heavals, but how do they fit in with the 
longue durée change of “emotional regimes” 
or “emotional styles” ? Are there certain 
emotional styles reflected in the emotional 
norms and con cepts in history that can be 
traced back to wartime experiences ? What 
is the influence of emotional experience 
of the world wars on the construction of 
the late twentieth-century style of relative 
freedom of emotional expression in the West48 
? One recent trend in the cultural history of 
war, adding to trauma studies, has indeed 
pointed towards the post-war periods with 
the focus on coping with a difficult past, re-
creation and social, cultural and emotional 
change49.
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2007. 49. For an imposing early work, see John w. Dower, Embracing Defeat : Japan in the 
Wake of World War II, New York, 1999; also Frank Biess, Homecomings : Returning POWs and 
the Legacies of Defeat in Postwar Germany, Princeton, 2006; riCharD Bessel & Dirk sChuman, 
(eds.), Life after Death : Approaches to a Cultural and Social History of Europe during the 1940s 
and 1950s, Cambridge, 2003; ville kivimäki & kirsi-maria hyTönen,(eds.), Rauhaton rauha : 
Suomalaiset ja sodan päättyminen 1944-1950 [The Restless Peace : The Finns and the End of 
War, 1944-1950], Tampere, 2015.
DR TUOMAS TEPORA (°1978) works currently as a university researcher at the Helsinki Collegium for Advan-
ced Studies. He has published widely on the history of emotions and the cultural history of war and nationa-
lism in early twentieth-century Finland. His works include the co-edited volume The Finnish Civil War 1918 : 
History, Memory, Legacy (Brill, 2014).
